Civil Practice—Preference in Docketing Denied Though Party Aged, Infirm, and Destitute by Farmelo, Neil R.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 1 Number 2 Article 10 
12-1-1951 
Civil Practice—Preference in Docketing Denied Though Party 
Aged, Infirm, and Destitute 
Neil R. Farmelo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Neil R. Farmelo, Civil Practice—Preference in Docketing Denied Though Party Aged, Infirm, and Destitute, 1 
Buff. L. Rev. 172 (1951). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol1/iss2/10 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ 
University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized 
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
one injured would fall within the risk created by his conduct. Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928); Mac Pherson v. Buick Mo-
tor Co., supra at 390, 111 N. B. at 1053. Social conditions that once demanded
temporary protective judicial legislation for manufacturers no longer exist. See
Seavey, Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 Harv. L Rev. 372, 379 (1939).
There are no legal or social barriers that now prevent approaching the man-
ufacturer liability cases from the standpoint of the general principles of negligence.
It is submitted that the complaint in Campo v. Scofield stated a cause of action in
negligence; a preclusion of a manufacturer's responsibility should not rest on the
patency or obviousness of the danger he creates.
Sheldon Hurwitz
CIVIL PRACTICE-PREFERENCE IN DOCKETING DENIED THOUGH PARTY
AGED, INFIRM, AND DESTITUTE
Plaintiff, over 72 years of age, received injuries in an accident allegedly due
to the negligence of the Defendant and moves for preference in docketing this
action for trial In support of this contention, the following facts are alleged.
Plaintiff received a fractured femur necessitating a metal pin in the hip, but is
too old for a cast. According to physician's affidavit, Plaintiff is "totally and
completely disabled," and according to physician's testimony under oath, Plain-
tiff's injury is permanent. Further, due to the effects of the injury and Plaintiff's
age, it is extremely likely that he may not survive to trial in the regular order.
The doctor bill is unpaid. Neither Plaintiff nor his wife, who is 70, has a bank
account. There is no insurance except a $500.00 life policy to cover burial
expenses. Plaintiff's income, received as Social Security benefits, is $35.00 a
month; that of his wife, $19.00 a month. They must pay $34.00 a month rent,
exclusive of gas and electricity. Only occasionally do various members of the
family contribute to their aid. Held (3-2): 'Motion for preference properly
denied under Rule 151 of Rules of Civil Practice. Bitterman v. 2007 Davidson
Avenue, Inc., 278 A. D. 759, 104 N. Y. S. 2d 81. (1st Dept. 1951).
Subsection (3) of Rule 151 states that preference may be granted in "an
action or special proceeding in which it is shown to the court or a judge thereof
that the interest of justice will be served by an early trial or hearing thereof."
This section was proposed by the Judicial Council to "simplify and consolidate
for the entire State the procedure to be followed in obtaining a preference." It
was designed to replace certain subdivisions of Section 138 of the Civil Practice
Act which were in a state of cumbersome confusion. Rule 151 was needed to
alleviate the technical procedure by which preference was being granted in nearly
all cases, and to return the exercise of discretion to a consideration of the facts
RECENT DECISIONS
and circumstances of each case as presented. "It is intended by this provision
(subsection (2) as proposed-subsection (3) as enacted)-to permit a cause to
be advanced for trial out of its regular order only if the facts of the particular
case show a necessity for such advancement, and to obviate the advancement of
causes simply because they fall into a specified category and without regard to
the need thereof, - - -." 6 N. Y. Jud. Council 45, 267-287. From the proposal
by the Judicial Council and wording of the rule by the Legislature as enacted, it
appears that application of subsection (3) of Rule 151 is to be guided by a review
of the facts of the particular case in the light of the interests of justice.
There is no case in which the First Department has handed down an opinion
containing its interpretation of subsection (3). However, other courts have con-
strued and applied the rule. Destitution is a basic criterion. Whithers v. News
Syndicate Co., 265 A. D. 868, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 780 (2nd, Dept. 1942). In Conroy
v. Erie R.R. Co., 188 Misc. 59, 66 N. Y. S. 2nd 433 (Sup. Ct. 1946), Plaintiff
was 71 years old, had both legs off and subsisted on charity. In view of .the cir-
cumstances, destitution created a need for preference. And where an order grant-
ing preference was reversed the court said, "There is no persuasive showing of
destitution." O'Callaghan v. Brawley, 276 A. D. 908,-94 N. Y. S. 2d 16 (2nd
Dept. 1950). Likelihood of death before trial can stand alone as grounds for
granting preference. Rinzler v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 190 Misc. 710, 75 N.
Y. S. 2d 867 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Healy v. Healy, 193 Misc. 62, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 874
(Sup. Ct. 1950). And when Plaintiff was 74 years of age and not likely to sur-
vive more than one year, the court reversed an order denying a motion for pref-
erence. Christenson v. Brooklyn and Queens Transit Corp., 241 A. D. 697 (2nd
Dept. 1944).
In view "of the criterion employed by other courts in applying the same sub-
section of the same rule, the purpose set out by the proposal of the Judicial Council
to the Legislature, and the wording of the rule itself, it is submitted that the hold-
ing in the instant case affirms an improvident exercise of discretion. Plaintiff is
72 years of age and permanently disabled. (cf. Conroy v. Erie R.R. Co., supra.)
According to expert testimony, Plaintiff is not likely to survive until trial in the
regular order. (cf. Christenson v. Brooklyn and Queens Transit Corp., supra.)
The action for which the motion was made is for.money damages, and therefore
it would seem that the interest of justice will be served if there is sufficient im-
mediate need for such recovery. After paying rent, Plaintiff and his wife have
$4.60 a week, or less than $.66 a day, out of which must come gas, electricity,
food and all other means of sustenance. Impoverishment, helpless physical con-
dition, advanced age and likelihood of death before trial are clearly present in
the circumstances under which this motion for preference was made. It is felt
that fiction could not have provided a more exemplary situation for which sub-
section (3) of Rule 151 was designed.
Neil R. Farmelo
